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Letter dated 18 June 2012 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, and in response to the letter of 13 June 2012 (A/66/850-S/2012/445) from the Permanent Mission of Qatar to the United Nations, I wish to make the following points.

The Syrian Arab Republic has expressed its commitment to the six-point plan of the United Nations Special Envoy Kofi Annan concerning Syria. It has cooperated transparently and in good faith with the United Nations observer mission and various United Nations agencies. It has also cooperated with Mr. Annan in order to ensure the success of his mission, which was intended to achieve a Syrian-led political solution to the crisis in Syria. The Syrian Arab Republic called on Mr. Annan to promote the principal item of the plan, namely the cessation of violence by all parties. Such action should include prevailing on all States that have influence with the parties of the Syrian armed opposition to cease funding, arming and sheltering the armed groups, and to cease providing them with communication devices that help them to kill. Those States should also refrain from any action that could fan or revive the flames of crisis in the country. Indeed, they should urge the armed opposition to engage with a political solution to the crisis.

The armed terrorist groups that operate in Syria are fundamentally dependent on foreign funding, which is provided by the Governments of certain Member States of this international Organization. Qatar is at the forefront of those States. It is therefore saddening and deplorable that the Permanent Representative of Qatar should insist that the Security Council take punitive measures against Syria. His own country's senior officials have not even taken the trouble to conceal its disruptive intentions. Qatar has openly continued to fund terrorist groups and incite them to spread chaos, violence and death in Syria in order to undermine the Annan plan. Its Government ought rather to desist from its shameful actions, which are costing the lives of thousands of innocent Syrians and destroying many of the achievements of the Syrian people which has, for decades, been building the nation and the citizen.

Qatar's rulers are squandering the wealth and resources of the Qatari people on futile adventurism in Syria and elsewhere. That disruptive approach can be of no benefit to Syria's territorial integrity and national unity, or indeed the peace and security of the region and the world. Nor can the Permanent Representative's letter in any way conceal the fact that Qatar has taken its scheming against Syria to

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considerable lengths, overstepping all of the red lines that govern relations between Arab and world States. Only two days after the adoption of Security Council resolution 2042 (2012), Amir Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani openly made statements that contravened the letter and spirit of the resolution, making patently obvious Qatar's plan to oppose any peaceful solution to the crisis in Syria. On his visit to Rome, the Amir of Qatar expressed a preconceived, premature and unilateral view of the observers' mission, saying, "The Annan plan has no more than a 3 per cent chance of success", and that "the Syrian people needs not peaceful support, but weapons!" Surely that is evidence enough that Qatar is involved in the shedding of Syrian blood?

Qatar's officials have persisted in making disruptive, misleading and inflammatory statements about what is happening in Syria, peddling lies, fabrications and slander through their Salafi media instrument known as Al-Jazeera, which has been spreading Al-Qaida propaganda since its foundation. It is Qatar that cooperated with the other Gulf States to end the Arab observer mission after it became clear to everyone, Arabs and non-Arabs alike, that the mission had done its duty by uncovering the policies of Qatar's rulers, who have continued to fund armed terrorist groups and to support terrorism and the shedding of innocent Syrian blood, taking advantage of legitimate calls for reform and sidestepping the facts.

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic strongly rejects those policies, which are inconsistent with the resolutions of the Security Council and the Special Envoy's mission. It calls on the Security Council immediately to fulfil its mandate to bring an end to support for terrorism, which is funded and armed by the Qatari Government with the aim of undermining Mr. Annan's mission and the relevant Security Council resolutions.

I should be grateful if this letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Permanent Representative of the
Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations

United Nations S/2012/448

Security Council

Distr.: General
20 June 2012

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Letter dated 15 June 2012 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1521 (2003) concerning Liberia addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1521 (2003) concerning Liberia, and in accordance with paragraph 5 (f) of resolution 2025 (2011), I have the honour to submit herewith the midterm report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia (see enclosure).

I would appreciate it if this letter, together with its enclosure, were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Abdullah Hussain **Haroon**
Chair
Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 1521 (2003) concerning Liberia

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Enclosure

Letter dated 24 May 2012 from the Panel of Experts on Liberia addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1521 (2003) concerning Liberia

The members of the Panel of Experts on Liberia have the honour to transmit the midterm report of the Panel, prepared in pursuance of paragraph 5 (f) of Security Council resolution 2025 (2011).

(*Signed*) Christian **Dietrich**

(*Signed*) Caspar **Fithen**

(*Signed*) Katrine **Kristensen**

Midterm report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia submitted pursuant to paragraph 5 (f) of Security Council resolution 2025 (2011)

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I. Introduction

1. By its resolution 1521 (2003), the Security Council imposed sanctions on exports of arms and ammunition to Liberia, a travel ban on individuals identified as constituting a threat to peace in Liberia, and sanctions on diamond and timber imports from Liberia. By its resolution 1532 (2004), the Council imposed an assets freeze on Charles Taylor and his associates. The Council has since lifted the sanctions on timber and diamonds and has modified the arms embargo, most recently by its resolution 1903 (2009), which resulted in limiting the arms embargo to non-State entities and individuals. By its resolution 2025 (2011), the Council renewed the travel ban initially imposed under paragraph 4 (a) of resolution 1521 (2003) for a further period of 12 months and reaffirmed that the freeze on assets of designated individuals and entities imposed by paragraph 1 of resolution 1532 (2004) remained in force.

2. By resolution 2025 (2011), the Security Council also extended until 13 December 2012 the mandate of the Panel of Experts on Liberia to investigate and report on the relevant sanctions measures. The Council has specifically requested the Panel to monitor possible violations of the arms embargo and travel ban and to assess the impact and effectiveness of the assets freeze. The Panel was also mandated to identify and make recommendations regarding areas where the capacity of Liberia and States in the region could be strengthened to facilitate implementation of the travel ban and assets freeze, and to assist the Committee established pursuant to Council resolution 1521 (2003), in updating the publicly available reasons for listing for entries on the Travel Ban and Assets Freeze Lists of the Committee.

3. In addition, the Security Council mandated the Panel to assess the contribution of forestry and other natural resources to peace, security and development in Liberia within the context of Liberia's evolving legal framework, and to assess the compliance of the Government of Liberia with the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme and to cooperate with the Kimberley Process in that assessment.

4. In a letter dated 24 February 2012 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2012/110), the Secretary-General announced the appointment of three experts: Christian Dietrich (United States of America), Caspar Fithen (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), and Katrine Kristensen (Denmark). Mr. Dietrich was selected to serve as Coordinator of the Panel. The Panel was further provided with two consultancies of a limited duration for cross-border trafficking and natural resources. One of the consultants, Raymond Debelle (Belgium), began working for the Panel on 13 May 2012.

II. Methodology

5. The present midterm report relates to the work conducted by the Panel of Experts from 24 February until 18 May 2012. The complete findings, analysis and recommendations relating to the full requirements of resolution 2025 (2011) will be presented in the Panel's final report in December 2012.

6. The Panel of Experts commenced its work on 24 February 2012, and briefed the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1521 (2003) concerning Liberia (the Committee), on its workplan on 9 March 2012. The Panel

thereafter conducted its first mission to Liberia in March and April 2012, and began with meetings in Monrovia with the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), as well as with Ministries and agencies of the Government of Liberia. The Panel further conducted investigations in Bong, Gbarpolu, Grand Cape Mount, Grand Gedeh, and River Gee Counties. Another field mission was conducted to Moyen-Cavally, Côte d'Ivoire, with the support of the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), where the Panel met with officials of the Government of Côte d'Ivoire and UNOCI staff. The Panel commenced its second mission to Liberia in May 2012, and provided support for the visit of the Chair of the Committee and also drafted its midterm report. Following the submission of the midterm report and the completion of the Chair's visit, the Panel conducted a further field investigation in Grand Gedeh County and plans to conduct a similar mission in Nimba County. The Panel of Experts was joined from mid-May 2012 by a consultant, Raymond Debelle, who travelled to Côte d'Ivoire to initiate his investigations for the Panel.

7. The Panel focused its initial investigations along the Liberian-Ivorian border, and particularly in Grand Gedeh County, with emphasis on the possible cross-border movement of combatants and weapons. The Panel continued its investigations of 2011 into Ivorian militia and Liberian mercenaries residing in Nimba, Grand Gedeh, River Gee and Maryland Counties primarily, as the Panel determined in its final 2011 report (S/2011/757) that those groups represented the most significant threat to the arms embargo imposed on non-governmental entities and individuals operating in Liberia in accordance with paragraph 4 of resolution 1903 (2009).

8. In all cases possible, the Panel has sought to rely on primary documentation and witness testimony, and has endeavoured to identify, locate and conduct interviews with Ivorian militia and Liberian mercenary commanders. The Panel further consolidated its arms trafficking, natural resources and financial investigations with a view to coordinating joint investigations into the role and significance of artisanal gold mines along the Liberian-Ivorian border as possible recruitment centres and sources of financing for raids or attacks from Liberia into Côte d'Ivoire. To that end, the Panel visited seven gold mines in Grand Gedeh and River Gee Counties, and also interviewed stakeholders and Government officials. The Panel further investigated allegations of external financing to Liberian mercenary commanders in Grand Gedeh County, including the possible disbursement of those funds to mobilize Ivorian militia residing in and around the refugee camps, especially in Grand Gedeh County. The Panel has focused particularly on links between several high-ranking former combatants in Liberia as well as elites of the former Ivorian regime of Laurent Gbagbo who currently reside in Ghana.

III. Natural resources

A. Assessment of the diamond sector

9. With the adoption of its resolution 1753 (2007), the Security Council lifted sanctions on the import of Liberian rough diamonds. Liberia has been a participant in the Kimberley Process since 4 May 2007 and began to export diamonds in September 2007. Specific requirements of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme include issuance of certificates for each shipment; internal controls for both

export and import of rough diamonds; maintenance and reporting of statistics; and cooperation and transparency.

10. Since the Panel's final 2011 report (S/2011/757), the head of the Government Diamond Office, Jerome Wotorson, left Liberia as a result of ill health for treatment in the United States in December 2011, and he has yet to return. The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme is now being managed by his deputy, Corvah Baysah, who, along with the Deputy Minister for Planning, Carlton Miller, should work to strengthen relations with the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme Secretariat.

11. The downstream export component (which values shipments and calculates royalties) at the Government Diamond Office continues to function, and, from 1 January to 30 March 2012, appraised and certified 9,945.04 carats for export, with a total value of $3,963,807.51. That equates to an average price of $398 per carat, which is far more in line with historical average price trends than the highly inflated average price for 2010 ($686.87 per carat). Furthermore, monthly volumes to date in 2012 also fall in line with historical figures.

	2011		*2012*	
Months	*Carats*	*Value (in United States dollars)*	*Carats*	*Value (in United States dollars)*
January	2 210.04	3 427 078.76	2 856.33	1 339 629.45
February	2 096.51	811 684.23	3 286.60	1 241 998.13
March	3 205.60	1 505 059.10	3 802.11	1 382 179.93
April	558.01	197 102.01		
May	4 685.70	1 483 262.11		
June	5 291.03	2 457 076.42		
July	4 525.58	1 662 733.15		
August	7 848.58	1 401 961.71		
September	3 410.25	817 931.36		
October	3 776.96	1 018 318.98		
November	1 094.88	217 961.69		
December	1 161.74	387 496.73		
Total	**39 864.88**	**15 387 666.25**	**9 945.04**	**3 963 807.51**
Average price ($)		386.00		398.57

Source: Liberian Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy.

12. However, the upstream component of internal controls, notably the network of 10 Regional Offices, the purpose of which is to make initial appraisals of quantity, colour and size in order to track production from mine to export, is no longer functioning effectively. That is a serious situation threatening to critically undermine the credibility of Liberia's entire Kimberley Process Certification Scheme.

13. Chronic underfunding and poor management are the principal reasons for the failure of that component of Liberia's Kimberley Process Certification Scheme mechanism. In March 2012 the Panel visited a number of Regional Offices in Grand

Cape Mount, Gbarpolu and Bong Counties and found them all to be closed. Most appeared to have been out of commission for many months. Regional Officers were largely absent, and those who were there complained that they were unpaid and that their motorcycles — vital for the effective monitoring of the sector — were not roadworthy either because they were short of spare parts or lacked the financial resources to purchase fuel.

14. The Panel also met artisanal miners in Grand Cape Mount and Gbarpolu Counties who complained that it was proving increasingly difficult to locate Regional Officers to appraise their production. Rather than travelling to Regional Offices, miners now have to actively search for Regional Officers to assess their goods and provide vouchers in order for them to legitimately sell their production to either brokers or exporters. Miners in close proximity to the Sierra Leone border said that many artisanal producers have now found it easier to travel to Kenema in Sierra Leone and market their diamonds there. It is an unfortunate irony that the fragile state of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme in Liberia is now actively encouraging cross-border trafficking to Sierra Leone simply because the Kimberley Process mechanism in Sierra Leone provides an easier and more effective conduit for the marketing of Liberian rough diamonds. While the Panel intends to visit Sierra Leone to make a full assessment of the problem, it will also be raising the issue at the Kimberley Process intersessional meeting in Washington, D.C., from 4 to 7 June 2012. The Panel is concerned by the loss of potential revenue to the Government of Liberia.

B. Alluvial diamond mining and security

15. With the inability of Regional Officers to travel into mining areas and proactively inspect the licence status of miners and brokers, as well as issue appraisal vouchers to miners, all diamond-producing areas in Liberia, particularly those in close proximity to the Sierra Leone and Guinea borders, have seen an upsurge in illegal mining.

16. The Panel met one Class B licence holder (with a valid licence) in Gbarpolu who complained that his concession had seen an influx of well over 500 illegal diggers, most of whom were Sierra Leonean. When he and his workers tried to move the diggers off, they were threatened with machetes and shotguns. The Class B miner believed that individuals in Kenema and Kono, both of which are in eastern Sierra Leone, are providing financial support to diggers to cross the Liberian border and mine illegally. Production from those mines is then trafficked back to Sierra Leone for certification and export.

17. The situation is further exacerbated by a lack of capacity within the Liberian Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization to effectively control Liberia's long and extremely porous borders. The Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization informed the Panel that, currently, it has 17 vehicles deployed in Monrovia (marked "Border Patrol"), leaving only 15 patrol vehicles for the remaining 14 counties. The Panel is concerned that rampant, uncontrolled and illegal mining is likely to impact negatively on the security profile of border areas. As one legitimately licensed Grand Cape Mount miner informed the Panel, "The bush is full up!", in other words, illegal mining is out of control.

C. Assessment of the gold sector

18. Liberia's alluvial gold sector continues to be a major concern. Alluvial gold production, both legal and illegal, continues to grow apace in a context of poor state control. Although the appraised value of gold exports has risen when compared month to month with figures for 2011 — a consequence of inflation in the international market price — the weight in ounces of exported gold remains broadly the same as in 2011, even though mining activity is increasing throughout the country.

Month	*No. of shipments*	*Weight in ounces*	*Appraised value (in United States dollars)*	*3 per cent royalty (in United States dollars)*
January	10	1 644.74	2 031 415.68	60 942.47
February	10	1 457.95	1 927 814.79	57 834.44
March	12	1 557.77	2 054 651.26	61 639.54
Total	**32**	**4 660.46**	**6 013 881.73**	**180 416.45**

Source: Liberian Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy.

19. Staff at the Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy Precious Minerals Office continue to complain of a lack of capacity to address the problem of illegal mining, particularly as much of it occurs in remote regions along the Ivorian, Sierra Leonean and Guinean borders. Many of the mining sites are inaccessible by vehicle during the dry season and become very isolated during the rains.

20. The Panel visited mining camps in Grand Gedeh County at Bartel Jam, Bentley, Wulu Town, New York, Dehkotee and Dark Forest, and Jolequin in River Gee County. In each site, mining activity was characterized by expansive pits with large numbers of diggers; the exception being Bartel Jam where hazardous deep-cast mining is undertaken by smaller groups of young men. Some of the shafts drop down 100 metres to gold seams, where ore is extracted and then lifted to the surface in baskets on ropes (see annexes 2 and 3). Fatalities from tunnel collapses are not uncommon. Moreover, it should be noted that that form of mining is prohibited under the terms of the Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy Class C licences, if, indeed, licences are held at all. Most of the more remote camps lack even basic services, and coupled with overcrowding, represent significant public health risks, particularly with regard to waterborne infections. The abuse of illegal drugs is widespread.

21. The Panel found that in most locations diggers were from across the region. The most numerous foreign labourers are Ivorian, but Sierra Leoneans, Guineans and Nigerians are also present in mines. In particular, many of the Ivorians are recruited from the refugee population by labour brokers. For example, a leader of the refugee camp on the site of the former Prime Timber Production informed the Panel that 1,500-2,000 Ivorian refugees from that camp alone work regularly in the gold mines of Grand Gedeh County. The Panel noted that the Ivorians were prepared to work for much lower rates, typically taking a smaller share of gold production than their Liberian counterparts. Women and children are not found in the mines as their presence is believed to bring bad luck.

22. Each camp is typically headed by a camp master, who is responsible for the allocation of land for building shelters and housing, and the informal policing of the settlement. Camp masters are assisted by mining chairmen, who organize mining activity and labour. Mining chairmen are usually diggers who opened concessions early on in the history of the camp and most claim to be Class C licence holders. Whether their licences are up to date or valid, however, is often open to question.

23. The poor administration of the alluvial mining sector is compounded by a lack of proactive management by Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy mineral inspectors and mining agents. As Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy officials are hampered by poor logistical capacity, and often unpaid for long periods of time, the Panel is concerned that the officials are extremely vulnerable to corruption. The Panel heard from several individuals, both miners and brokers, that some officials will ignore the expiration of licences or illegal digging in return for payment in either cash or gold. On 31 March 2012, the Panel observed a government mining agent taking bribes in Dehkotee and Dark Forest mining camps, both of which are in Grand Gedeh County.

24. The Panel also interviewed three legitimate licensed brokers in Jolequin, River Gee County. All complained that the market has become increasingly dominated by illegal brokers and their agents. Many of the illegal brokers are not Liberian nationals and, in fact, have travelled to the country from as far as Mauritania, Senegal, the Gambia and Mali. While some of the illegal production is trafficked out of Liberia across the Guinean, Ivorian and Sierra Leonean borders, initial findings by the Panel suggest that most of the gold is shipped to Monrovia, where it is purchased by a small number of exporters and then smuggled abroad. Determining an accurate monthly figure for illegally trafficked gold is extremely difficult. However, the Panel has interviewed experienced industry figures in Liberia, as well as current and former Ministry officials, who believe that trafficked gold may represent up to three times the volume of gold that passes through legitimate, government channels. If indeed that is the case, monthly volumes of trafficked gold could be about $6 million. The Panel intends to evaluate and assess gold imports in a number of international markets in order to shed some light on the illicit Liberian gold trade.

25. After extensive investigations into the mechanics of the illicit trade, the Panel has learned that some exporters who are fully licensed are declaring to the Government only a small percentage of the gold that they handle on a monthly basis, and traffic the rest. By doing that, an appearance of legitimacy is maintained and, by avoiding export royalties, exporters are able to bid for gold in the market at a premium, thus outpricing competition. Industry sources informed the Panel that most of the gold is moved to international market centres, where it is smelted, refined and then sold.

26. Concerned by that illicit trade, the Panel attended a forum in Paris on 2-3 May 2012 held by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on the implementation of due diligence in the gold supply chain. While the focus of concern for the industry downstream is gold produced in areas beset by conflict in Central Africa, notably the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its neighbours, the Panel noted that many of the proposals for enhanced controls have much to offer West Africa, in particular Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire, and urges the Government of

Liberia to engage with OECD at the earliest opportunity in order to find ways of strengthening its control over the Liberian alluvial gold sector.

D. Alluvial gold mining and security

27. Given the amount of gold and money in circulation, the issues for national and cross-border security are considerable. Border porosity facilitates illegal mining, and land and title disputes are beginning to arise, not only within the alluvial sector, but also between the alluvial and the industrial sectors. Furthermore, much of the gold mining activity occurs in very close proximity to sensitive border regions.

28. On 29 March 2012, the Panel met with expatriate and national security officials at a major, multinational iron ore mining operation in River Gee County. The iron ore concession is extensive and the company has struggled to contain an influx of illegal gold miners on its property. The Panel was informed that Liberty Camp, close to the company headquarters, was run by a Nigerian national who had recruited at least 100 Liberian diggers. While the camp does not yet present a direct threat to operations, when exploration projects do move into the area, security officials are concerned that conflict may arise. The iron ore company operates in a context of delicate community relations, which in 2011 saw local unrest, exacerbated by the appearance of a secret society masquerade, and the death of two Liberians who looted a company vehicle and subsequently crashed it, leading to the suspension of company operations at a cost of $150,000 per day. Illegal mining is also encroaching on industrial gold concessions held by Hummingbird Resources and Middle Island Resources, both in Grand Gedeh County.

29. There have also been other security-related incidents. On 9 December 2011, 15 Forces républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire personnel crossed into Liberia in the proximity of Toe Town, Grand Gedeh County, and arrested gold diggers at the Peace Gold Mining Camp, claiming that they had been mining illegally in Côte d'Ivoire. They were removed back across the border to Toulepleu, Côte d'Ivoire, and held for some days before being released.

30. In May 2011, armed personnel of the Emergency Response Unit (ERU) of the Liberia National Police were deployed to Golo Town to arrest two suspects in connection with a fatal, cross-border, armed robbery at a gold camp in Côte d'Ivoire. The ERU personnel fled when confronted by another "bush devil" masquerade and one ERU officer was subsequently taken hostage and not freed for some days. The case is remarkable in that it demonstrates the power of traditional authority, particularly in the remote hinterland of the border region, over the apparently weaker power of the State, even when State officials are armed with automatic weapons. The Panel intends to visit Golo Town to conduct an assessment of the situation there.

31. While there are clearly problems associated with gold mining, namely, land disputes, trafficking, illegal mining and security, it should be noted that the sector does provide employment for young men. Furthermore, with regard to potential "hot spots", the Panel found during its field investigations that some mining camps appeared to raise greater security concerns than others.

32. At Bartel Jam and Bentley Camps in Grand Gedeh County, and Jolequin in River Gee County, there were Liberia National Police (LNP) stations. These towns were clearly better organized; some had schools and clinics and all had many shops

selling a wide variety of goods from mining equipment to clothes and food. Additionally, the authorities in those camps were relatively welcome and open to the Panel during the course if its investigations. However, at the smaller, more remote camps, like Wulu Town and New York for example, there was no State authority and miners and inhabitants were suspicious and more reluctant to talk to Panel members.

33. Moreover, the Panel subsequently learned that following its visit, Wulu Town residents arrested and briefly detained a United Nations police officer, an LNP officer and an UNMIL human rights official on 25 April 2012 who had visited the camp to investigate the incarceration of foreign miners by the camp master. The Panel also found New York Camp to be tense in the wake of an ERU raid on 24 January 2012 to arrest militia fighters who had fought in Côte d'Ivoire. Panel investigations will continue to focus on those camps and the individuals associated with them.

E. Liberia Extractive Industries Initiative

34. The Panel has commenced discussions with the Liberian Extractive Industries Initiative and will present a full assessment and findings in its final report.

F. Forestry

35. The Panel has commenced discussions with the Forestry Development Authority and will present a full assessment and findings in its final report.

IV. Tracing arms embargo violations and monitoring weapons registration

A. Tracing arms

36. Given Liberia's porous borders, it remains a challenge to monitor the trafficking and circulation of weapons and ammunition. However, the LNP and the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization have been successful in retrieving smaller caches of arms and ammunition in the Liberian-Ivorian border region, and smaller amounts of weapons and ammunition have likewise been voluntarily handed over to UNOCI and the Forces républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire.

37. Liberian and UNMIL officials informed the Panel that on 16 November 2011 the ERU in Toe Town, Grand Gedeh County, recovered 385 rounds of ammunition, following information provided by a local farmer, from a nearby bush area in the border region with Côte d'Ivoire.

38. On 28 December 2011, two sealed boxes of 12.7 mm ammunition, two RPG-7s and one RPG-7 tail fuse were recovered by the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization after receiving information through a local resident at the NikoBhai (Toe Town) border crossing point, Grand Gedeh County. On 28 December 2011, the ERU, under the LNP, recovered a smaller arms cache consisting of 15 AK-47 assault rifles, 2 RPG rocket launchers, 1 PKM heavy machine gun, 1 FAL M3 rifle (FabriqueNationaleHerstal, Belgium), 440 rounds of 7.62 x 39 mm ammunition, 9 rounds of 7.62 x 51 mm ammunition, 4 RPG fuels, 4 RPG anti-personnel rockets

and 1 RPG anti-tank rocket. According to UNMIL, the cache was found as a consequence of information handed over to the ERU in Zwedru, Grand Gedeh County. Again on 21 January 2012, as part of the same operation, the ERU recovered 2 hand grenades (Bulgarian and French made), 9 RPG rockets and 5 VOG-17 (30 mm grenade). The Panel has not ruled out that some of those weapons discoveries resulted from the sale of small caches under the control of combatant commanders.

39. In addition, on 19 March 2012, two young men were arrested by the LNP for being in possession of an AK-47 rifle, a magazine and seven rounds of ammunition, on the outskirts of the Wulu Town gold camp in Zwedru, Grand Gedeh County. The Panel is continuing to investigate the case, because while the suspects claimed to have found the AK-47 in the Cavalla River, the weapon appears to have been in serviceable condition, suggesting that it had been obtained from a different location.

40. According to UNMIL, a large proportion of the recovered arms and ammunition were destroyed on 7 February 2012. The Panel welcomes the continued engagement of UNMIL in the destruction of weapons in order to limit the circulation of arms in Liberia. However, the Panel would like to recall paragraph 96 of its final 2011 report (S/2011/757), emphasizing that weapons that are part of a criminal case should not be destroyed before a proper investigation has been conducted. The Panel has also noted the difficulties in obtaining proper information on serial numbers and manufacture stamps of recovered weapons. The Panel has reviewed photographs of recovered weapons, but owing to their poor quality, it has often been difficult to identify serial numbers and manufacturers' stamps. In this regard, the Panel would recommend that high-resolution photographs of individual weapons be taken and stored in a comprehensive database along with specific information on recovered weapons, including the date of incident.

41. Furthermore, the Panel would recommend that the LNP and UNMIL share relevant data on the recovery of weapons with UNOCI and the authorities in Côte d'Ivoire, and vice versa, in order to create a more detailed and comprehensive picture of recovered weapons and ammunition, including provenance and country of manufacture.

42. As noted in the 2011 final report of the Panel (S/2011/757, para. 86), there are strong indications that arms and ammunition are hidden in the border region — but with the majority hidden on the Ivorian side of the border. The Panel has received information that arms caches generally may be found in the forest areas around Toulepleu, along the Cavalla River, and further south around Tai in western Côte d'Ivoire. Those areas correspond to the routes that pro-Gbagbo militias took while fleeing into Liberia and the Panel is seeking additional information on the location of arms caches from its sources. According to sources both within UNMIL and UNOCI, as well as former Ivorian combatants interviewed by the Panel, most combatants are still waiting for improvements in the security situation in western Côte d'Ivoire, as well as the beginning of a comprehensive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, before they will consider parting with their weapons in exchange for payment and retraining options.

B. Artisanal weapons

43. The uncontrolled trafficking into Liberia of artisanal weapons — 12-gauge single barrel shotguns with either long or short barrels — remains a concern to the

Panel. According to UNMIL, the LNP recovered an estimated 62 artisanal weapons during the first quarter of 2012, as compared to 18 during the same period in 2011. As noted by the Panel in its 2011 final report (S/2011/757), there are indications that most artisanal weapons used in Liberia are manufactured and sold by local blacksmiths in Guinea, particularly around Guekedou, Macenta and N'Zerekore. To a lesser degree, some are also manufactured in Liberia. The Panel was informed that the border towns of Ganta, Nimba County, and Voinjama, Lofa County, are some of the main transit centres for onward trafficking into Liberia as well as into Côte d'Ivoire. The single barrel shotgun is the most easily obtained firearm in Liberia, as well as in the wider region. According to former combatants that the Panel interviewed in Côte d'Ivoire, the 12-gauge single barrel shotgun was widely used during the recent crisis in that country. The Panel will continue its investigation of artisanal weapons being trafficked into, and transited through, Liberia.

C. Handover of responsibility for weapons and ammunition storage to the Armed Forces of Liberia

44. The UNMIL Arms Inspection Teams maintain quarterly inspections of arms, ammunition and related materiel imported for training the Armed Forces of Liberia. Those stocks, however, have been under the control of the United States Government, through the private security company DynCorp. The Panel notes that in December 2011, the United States Ambassador and the Minister of Defence signed a transition plan for the handover of responsibility of weapons and ammunition to the Armed Forces of Liberia. As part of the transition plan, the Armed Forces of Liberia have gradually taken over responsibility for monitoring the armoury from DynCorp, and the United States Government handed over all responsibility for weapons and ammunition to the Armed Forces of Liberia on 10 May 2012.

45. According to UNMIL, the Arms Inspection Teams will continue inspections in line with regulations by the Sanctions Committee. However, UNMIL has expressed concern that heavy weapons did not have Government of Liberia markings, only the factory serial numbers, and that there are indications that the Armed Forces of Liberia intends to store weapons in several locations rather than one site, as has been the procedure to date. It should also be noted that the Armed Forces of Liberia Emergency Response Company responsible for guarding the armoury is not yet fully operational.

D. Compliance with paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1903 (2009)

46. In accordance with paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1903 (2009), all States shall notify the Sanctions Committee established pursuant to resolution 1521 (2003), in advance of any shipment of arms or training-related materials to the Government of Liberia, or any provision of assistance, advice or training related to military activities for the Government of Liberia.

47. The Government of Nigeria informed the Committee by a note dated 3 May 2012, that Nigeria concluded arrangements for the delivery to the Government of Liberia by 9 May 2012 of 300 G3 rifles and 10,000 rounds of 7.62 mm ammunition. UNMIL informed the Panel that the delivery did not take place as scheduled, but that delivery instead occurred on 15 May 2012. The Panel would like to reiterate its

recommendation in its final 2011 report (S/2011/757, para. 107), encouraging the Government of Liberia to fulfil its obligations, in accordance with paragraph 12 (e) of the Committee's guidelines,[1] by marking the weapons and ammunition, maintaining an updated registry and notifying the Committee formally in writing within six weeks of the date of delivery.

E. Small Arms Control Act and National Commission on Small Arms

48. The Panel notes with concern that no progress has been achieved since the Panel's last report (S/2011/757) on the adoption of a National Small Arms Control Act and a Bill for the establishment of the Liberian Small Arms Commission. However, the Panel notes that the Executive Mansion has instituted for the third time an executive order in its commitment to control small arms in the country. Executive Order 34 of 25 October 2011 replaced Executive Order 28 (2010) and Executive Order 6 (2007). Executive Order 34 imposes a total ban on ownership, possession, use, sale or manufacture of firearms and ammunition in Liberia, with the exception of single barrel shotguns used solely for hunting, provided that they have been registered with the Ministry of Justice through the Office of the Superintendents in each County (annex 4). Executive Order 34 is thus the only current legislative framework in addition to the Firearms Traffic Act of 1956.

49. According to UNMIL, a revised National Small Arms Control Act has been drafted, and comprehensive consultations have taken place with the aim of enacting the Act in conjunction with the adoption of the Bill of the National Commission on Small Arms. It should be noted that the President of Liberia, after entering her second term of office, placed the approval of Small Arms Legislation, including the establishment of the Small Arms Commission, in her 150-day action plan.

50. The Panel would like to emphasize the importance of accelerating the process of enacting the law on Small Arms Control with a view to enhancing security in the country through a comprehensive legislative framework to govern and control the distribution, possession and circulation of small arms.

V. Liberian mercenaries and Ivorian militia

51. The Panel has continued to examine ongoing ties and interlinked command structures between Liberian mercenaries and Ivorian militia residing in Liberia. Previous command structures both within the militia and mercenaries, and between those groups, remain strong according to combatants interviewed by the Panel. The Panel remains concerned that certain networks of Liberian mercenaries and Ivorian militia with interlinked allegiances, and who are in constant communication, could be a threat to peace and stability in the border region.

52. The Panel continued investigations into the three cases it presented in its December 2011 final report (S/2011/757) involving the imprisonment or internment of suspected Liberian mercenaries and Ivorian militia and ex-combatants. The first case concerned the internment of 86 Ivorians who had crossed into Maryland County, Liberia, on 1 April 2011 with the Liberian mercenary general Augustine

[1] Available from: www.un.org/sc/committees/1521/pdf/1521_Committee_Guidelines.pdf.

Vleyee (see S/2011/757, paras. 25-30, and S/2011/367, paras. 22, 23 and 37). Those individuals were imprisoned in Harper, Maryland County, and subsequently transferred to Wainsue Internment Centre, Bong County, on 12 June 2011. All but two of the internees were released by April 2012, and currently reside primarily in refugee camps around Zwedru, Grand Gedeh County. The second case concerned the imprisonment of the Liberian mercenary general Isaac Chegbo (aka Bob Marley), who was initially detained on 13 April 2011 (see S/2011/757, paras. 31-34, and S/2011/367, para. 21). Chegbo was released on bail by the Government of Liberia in February 2012, and currently resides in Zwedru, Grand Gedeh County. The third case concerned the imprisonment of 38 Ivorians who had crossed into Liberia at the village of Tasla, near Youbor, River Gee County, on 24 May 2011. The Liberian chief of Tasla village was also imprisoned with the Ivorians. That group was part of a larger force of approximately 85 armed Ivorian combatants and Liberian mercenaries who had fled Abidjan on 3 May 2011, and entered Liberia with their weapons and ammunition following clashes with the Forces républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire, the armed forces of the Ouattara Government in Côte d'Ivoire, and after committing extrajudicial killings of Ivorian civilians. Most of the members of that convoy who crossed into River Gee County remain at large, and several were involved in security incidents in Grand Gedeh County in early 2012.

53. The Panel further conducted investigations into two new incidents that occurred in January and April 2012. The first incident concerned the likely recruitment of Ivorian combatants in Liberia to attack Côte d'Ivoire. Those individuals, along with a Liberian mercenary recruiter, were arrested at New York gold camp, Grand Gedeh County, in January 2012, but released from jail in Zwedru in February 2012. The second incident concerned an attack on the village of Sakré, close to Tai, in Moyen-Cavally, Côte d'Ivoire, in April 2012. Information obtained by the Panel suggests that the attack was planned and launched by Liberian mercenaries from Konobo District, Grand Gedeh County, in Liberia, using Ivorian militia soldiers.

A. Wainsue internment camp

54. The Panel noted that the 86 Ivorians who crossed into Liberia with the Liberian mercenary general Augustine Vleyee ("Bush Dog") were initially held for illegal possession of firearms and then transferred to Harper prison in April 2011. The Liberian prosecution contended that the prisoners were former combatants from Côte d'Ivoire and therefore posed a threat to peace and security in Liberia, but no charges were brought because the Government of Liberia lacked sufficient evidence. The failure of the prosecution also appears to be linked to the improper handling of evidence, as well as the low quality of statements taken from the accused by the LNP. The Harper Circuit Court ruled on 25 May 2011 that the Ivorians were being held unlawfully and were to be relocated to a secured encampment site. They were subsequently transported to an internment camp in Wainsue, Bong County, on 12 June 2011.

55. The responsibility for the establishment and maintenance of an internment camp for Ivorian refugees was not formalized until late May 2011. The Liberian Internment Task Force met for the first time on 23 May 2011 under the direction of the Liberian Ministry of Justice, following a writ of habeas corpus filed by the public defender representing the Ivorian detainees. The Task Force was subsequently chaired by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. During June and October 2011, an initial

screening took place identifying 13 juveniles, and in addition, a further rescreening of the internees took place between 19 and 21 November 2011. UNMIL reported that the individuals were screened for approximately 10 minutes each to determine their previous status as combatants in Côte d'Ivoire, and that a comprehensive threat assessment was not conducted. The Task Force noted the results of the screening on 13 December 2011: 53 internees were determined to be ex-combatants (one was later determined to be a juvenile); 16 determined to be civilians; 3 determined juveniles in addition to those already identified; and 3 suspected to be Liberian mercenaries. At that time, the Ministry of Internal Affairs sought to phase out the internment centre by February 2012, citing a lack of funds to maintain the camp.

56. The Liberian Ministry of Internal Affairs submitted a letter to the manager of Wainsue internment camp on 1 March 2012 ordering the release of 68 internees based on the decision by the Task Force. The Wainsue camp manager then issued a memorandum on 10 March 2012 ordering the release of the internees on 13 March 2012. All the internees concerned were granted refugee status and transferred to reception centres, primarily the Prime Timber Production refugee camp, Grand Gedeh County.

57. The Panel has not received any information concerning the reasons for the decision of the Government of Liberia to release the internees, aside from financial constraints, or on what basis the Ivorians were differentiated between 16 "innocent internees", 52 "internees" and 3 mercenaries. The latter three were charged with mercenarism and sent to Gbarnga Prison, Bong County, on 13 March 2012, along with two remaining internees, who were charged with conspiracy, murder, unlawful traffic in arms, management of militia, participation in armed gangs, theft and looting. The charges of the latter two were outlined in a letter from the Government of Côte d'Ivoire to the Government of Liberia on 23 February 2012.

58. UNMIL informed the Panel that the three individuals accused of mercenarism — Zoulou Geui Taar, Bahi Thierry and Tafin D. Albert — were released from Gbarnga Prison on 19 April 2012. The two other individuals who were subjects of the Ivorian letter — Oulai Patrick and Kei Bah Donatien — were transferred to the Zwedru Palace of Corrections. The Panel notes that although the 13 December 2011 Task Force meeting cited three Liberians who would be charged with mercenarism, the Liberia Correctional Service intake forms for the three lists only one individual with a Liberian nationality — Bahi Thierry — and lists the other two as Ivorians. That error appears to be related to the fact that the individuals are Krahn/Guerre, and have family ties to communities on both sides of the Liberian-Ivorian border.

59. The Panel visited Gbarnga Prison on 24-25 March 2012 and interviewed the five detainees. The individuals provided the Panel with additional background information, including a more accurate spelling of their names compared with documents obtained from the Government of Liberia: Zoulou Taha Guei (Ivorian); Thierry Bahi (Liberian); Doba Alfred Tafin (Ivorian); Kanon Serge Patrick Ouhady (Ivorian); Donatien Kei Bah (Ivorian). The Panel received testimony that one of the individuals — Doba Alfred Tafin — served as a deputy leader of the Ivorians at the internment camp. The Panel was further informed that the leader of the Ivorians at the camp was Hypollite Poh Beh, who facilitated the transfer of money to Wainsue by courier from Côte d'Ivoire in order to buy food and clothing for the internees. Hypollite also served as the spokesman for the internees when the Panel visited the Harper Prison in May 2011. During the Panel's interviews with the five detainees at

Gbarnga Prison in March 2012, the Panel was informed that Hypollite had served as a militia commander in Bioléquin, Côte d'Ivoire, and facilitated the transport of arms and ammunition by truck south from Guiglo to Tabou in March 2011, together with another Ivorian militia commander, Oulai Tako, and the Liberian mercenary general Augustine Vleyee. The Panel cited that information in its 2011 final report (see S/2011/757, paras. 25-30, and para. 54), and notes that the witness testimony obtained during the current mandate further substantiates the Panel's previous findings.

60. The Panel is continuing to investigate how the Government of Liberia did not accurately identify Hypollite Poh Beh, especially following the issuance of the Panel's report in December 2011 (S/2011/757), and why the Government of Côte d'Ivoire did not seek his arrest, as in the cases of Kanon Serge Patrick Ouhady and Donatien Kei Bah. Witness statements obtained by the Panel at Gbarnga Prison noted that Hypollite was transferred along with the majority of internees to Prime Timber Production refugee camp near Zwedru, Grand Gedeh County, following his release from the Wainsue internment camp in March 2012. The Panel has obtained information that Oulai Tako and Augustine Vleyee, the two other commanders of the convoy that crossed into Maryland County, currently reside in the vicinity of Zwedru, Grand Gedeh County, and are alleged to be involved in the planning of cross-border attacks into Côte d'Ivoire by Liberian mercenaries and Ivorian militia.

B. The Isaac Chegbo case

61. The Panel previously provided information on the case of the Liberian mercenary general Isaac Chegbo, also known by his noms de guerre "Bob Marley" and "Child Could Die" (S/2011/757, paras. 31-34, and S/2011/367, para. 21). The Panel has continued to collect information on the involvement of Chegbo in the Ivorian conflict in 2010 and 2011, and to determine his allegiances to other Liberian mercenary generals and Ivorian militia commanders currently residing in Liberia.

62. The LNP took a statement from Isaac Chegbo on 22 May 2011 in Monrovia, in which he admitted in detail how he fought as a mercenary in Côte d'Ivoire in 2011 (annex 5). Chegbo noted that a Liberian named Soloe from Maryland County, recruited him on behalf of the former Gbagbo regime to fight the Forces républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire in Côte d'Ivoire. Soloe is the same individual identified by the Panel as Solomon Seakor (S/2011/757, paras. 26, 36, 45-46, and 54). Chegbo told the LNP that, according to Soloe, the former Gbagbo regime offered payment in the form of the total goods that the Liberian fighters could loot during the conflict. Chegbo, along with four other Liberian mercenary generals (Augustine Vleyee, Jefferson Gbarjolo, Paulsen Garteh and Bobby Sarpee) travelled from Guiglo to Abidjan and met with Jean Oulai Delafosse, who also confirmed that as payment for fighting, the Liberians could keep anything they captured during the conflict (as noted in S/2011/757, paras. 44-51). Chegbo related to the LNP that the Gbagbo regime authorities provided his men with 55 AK-47s, and that their first military operation was conducted in Toulepleu against the Forces républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire. Chegbo noted that following counter-attacks by the Forces républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire, he and his remaining men retreated to Liberia with their weapons.

63. Notwithstanding Chegbo's statement to the LNP, as well as additional information published concerning his role in the Ivorian conflict in 2011 (see S/2011/757, paras. 31-34, 36, 39-41, 50-51, and 54), the Government of Liberia failed to prosecute Chegbo under mercenarism in accordance with section 11.13 of the Liberian penal code. The Monrovia Circuit Court C released Chegbo from prison on bail on 1 February 2012, and the Panel has endeavoured to obtain information relating to the basis for that ruling. Chegbo initially remained in Monrovia following his release, and is currently residing in Zwedru. The Panel has been informed that Chegbo attended meetings among Liberian mercenaries in Grand Gedeh County following his return to Grand Gedeh County to discuss and plan cross-border attacks into Côte d'Ivoire. The Panel is continuing to investigate Chegbo's role in those activities.

C. The Youbor case

64. The Panel previously provided information regarding the case of the cross-border movement of armed Liberian and Ivorian combatants from Côte d'Ivoire to Glaro District, River Gee County, on 24 May 2011 (S/2011/757, paras. 64-75, and paras. 89-91). The Panel noted that 36 Ivorian members of that convoy had been arrested in River Gee County between 16 and 19 June 2011, charged with mercenarism, and transferred to the Zwedru Palace of Corrections on 20 June 2011. The Liberian chief of Tasla village, where the individuals hid their weapons, was also detained and jailed in Zwedru under charges of criminal facilitation. Three additional members of the convoy were arrested in Fishtown on 19 August 2011, charged with mercenarism and transferred to the Zwedru Palace of Corrections. Lastly, the Liberian mercenary commander of the convoy known as Mark Miller, whom the Panel identified as Mark Doty Wilson, was arrested by the Liberian authorities on 12 December 2011 on charges of criminal facilitation, and was transferred to the Zwedru Palace of Corrections.

65. The Panel notes that the individuals involved in that case have been incarcerated for nearly one year without their case having been brought to trial. Moreover, the prosecution has not provided good cause for the delay. The prosecution moved the 7th Judicial Circuit Court in Zwedru in August 2011 to advance the case to the November 2011 Term of Court. During the November 2011 Term of Court, the prosecution moved the Court to change the place of prosecution, but that motion was denied, and the Court ruled the case for trial during the February 2012 Term of Court. To enable preparations by the defence, the judge of the 7th Judicial Circuit Court of Zwedru ordered the prosecution on 11 December 2011 to provide to the defence by 1 February 2012 the voluntary statements made by the defendants, as well as the River Gee Grand Jury testimonies that served as the basis for the charges against the defendants. The prosecution, however, did not obey the court order. On 13 April 2012, the defence lawyer also withdrew his motion to dismiss the case, and the case was again adjourned to the next Term of Court.

66. The Panel has reiterated its offer to the Liberian Ministry of Justice to provide relevant information and documentation to assist in the case. At the time of submission of the present report, the Panel has not received a reply from the Ministry of Justice in that regard. The Panel notes that the Grand Gedeh County Attorney submitted a petition to the Court on 11 May 2012 to extradite and deport

the detained Ivorians to Côte d'Ivoire, based upon a request from the Government of Côte d'Ivoire. The Panel notes that more than half of the individuals who crossed into Liberia as part of that convoy avoided apprehension by the LNP in June 2011, and remain at large. There is a very high likelihood that nine of those individuals were arrested at New York gold camp in January 2012 and later released (see case below).

D. New York gold mine arrests

67. The LNP arrested 73 Ivorians (including two women) and one Liberian suspected of planning an attack from Liberia into Côte d'Ivoire in January 2012. The LNP and UNMIL received reports on 23 January 2012 concerning the movement of approximately 80 Ivorian refugees about 40 km west of Zwedru, Grand Gedeh County, to a small gold mining camp comprising several houses, which is located in the vicinity of three major gold mines. LNP officers in Bentley gold mining camp, in the proximity of New York camp, were first informed that the Ivorians were preparing an attack into Côte d'Ivoire, and were travelling to the gold mining camp under the authority of a Liberian national named Tailey Gladior, a former general of the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL). Gladior had also served as a mercenary recruiter in 2010 and 2011 for the pro-Gbagbo forces in Moyen-Cavally, Côte d'Ivoire (S/2011/757, para. 47). The LNP and ERU travelled to the New York gold camp and arrested the Ivorians, as well as Gladior, on 24 January 2012. The suspects were then transported to the Zwedru police station the same day with the assistance of UNMIL.

68. The LNP County Commander requested the Magistrate to detain the suspects temporarily at the Zwedru Palace of Corrections during the investigation on 24 January 2012 as there was insufficient space to securely house the suspects at the Zwedru LNP station. According to UNMIL, the Magistrate agreed to that request, but one hour later, the Zwedru City Solicitor, Grand Gedeh County Attorney and Magistrate subsequently declined to allow the suspects to be detained at the Palace of Corrections during the investigation without charge sheets. As a result, the 74 suspects were detained in two cells and one room at the LNP station between 24 and 26 January 2012. The UNMIL Formed Police Unit provided support for the LNP to prevent the detainees from escaping or assaulting the police officers. The difficult conditions of detention prevented the LNP from recording the names of all of the suspects, or interviewing them in a timely manner, as there was insufficient manpower to do so safely.

69. The LNP interviewed only 24 of the 74 detainees before they were charged and transferred to the Palace of Corrections on 26 January 2012. Five interviews were conducted on the evening of 24 January 2012, with the other 19 conducted on 25 January 2012. UNMIL was informed by the LNP that during the arrest at New York gold camp, some of the suspects had initially accepted the charge that they were planning an attack across the border in Côte d'Ivoire and were to obtain weapons in Côte d'Ivoire. The suspects who were interviewed by the LNP from the evening of 24 January and during the day of 25 January 2012 denied the charge. The United Nations Police noted that the detainees provided rehearsed answers to the LNP partly because of the communal housing of the detainees, whereby the individuals could not be separated following interrogation. Another problem concerned the language barrier between French and English speakers, and between

local languages used by the LNP officers and the detainees. The greatest issue appears to have been the lack of capacity of the LNP officers to conduct useful interviews with suspects. All but five of the interviews were one page or less in length, and the statements provided mainly superficial information concerning events on the day of arrest, and the means by which the Ivorians had travelled to the New York gold camp. In only a few cases do the statements provide useful or actionable information to assist future investigations (see annexes 6, 8 and 9 for examples of witness statements).

70. One example that highlights the LNP lack of capacity to employ proper investigation techniques, and emphasizes the need for a master database of ex-combatants, concerns an individual who was part of the New York gold camp case, as well as the Youbor arms case. The statement of a 26-year-old Ivorian named Kenan Djouhombleca (last names) Hyacinthe Anderson (first names) is 131 words long, and provides such limited information that it is of almost of no use to investigators (annex 6). The Panel believes that he is the same 26-year-old Ivorian Kenan D. H. Anderson who arrived with the Youbor convoy in May 2011, as cited in the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees paperwork concerning pre-screening (annex 7). This individual was also included in a list of Ivorian members of the convoy under the name Kenan Djouhombleca Hyacinthe, as written by the group's leader, Henri Joel Guehi Bleka (see S/2011/757, para. 69, and annex 7). The Panel obtained a photograph of Guehi Bleka writing the names on the list in Youbor in May 2011, as well as a writing sample from that individual in August 2011 to further substantiate evidence as to the identification of those involved in the Youbor case.

71. Aside from the fact that the LNP interviewed only about one third of the detainees, and the vast majority of the interviews contained irrelevant information, the interview process faced serious, additional flaws. The LNP did not take photographs of the detainees. The UNMIL formed police unit photographed many of the individuals, but there is no record as to the correlation between the photographs and the names of the individuals. Moreover, the LNP in Zwedru does not have a copy of the photographs, or indeed a functioning computer to maintain digital photographs. In many cases, the last names and first names of the detainees were confused by the LNP, and spelled incorrectly. Some of the former detainees told the Panel in March 2012 during interviews in Zwedru that the LNP had confiscated their identification documents on 24 and 25 January 2012, including their refugee cards, which the LNP reportedly discarded. The Liberian Ministry of Justice file for the detainees does not contain copies of identification cards, or other forms of identification for the detainees, which would have assisted in the proper recording of the individuals during the interview process. Those individuals also complained to the Panel that the arresting officers (LNP and ERU) confiscated a number of mobile telephones belonging to the accused. Those items were never entered as evidence, and were likely stolen by the officers. The mobile phones of the detainees could have provided critical information on linkages to other suspected militia and mercenaries, as well as sources of external support.

72. The detainees were transferred to the Zwedru Palace of Corrections on 26 January 2012 under the charge of mercenarism in accordance with section 11.13 of the Liberian penal code. Following that, the LNP could no longer interrogate the detainees. At the time, UNMIL noted that the mercenarism charge would not apply to the detainees, since all but one were Ivorian nationals, and were allegedly

planning an attack into Côte d'Ivoire. The County Attorney of Grand Gedeh dropped the charges against the 74 detainees on 20 February 2012, and they were released from jail. The Panel has been informed by some of the former detainees that the Ivorians returned to refugee camps in Grand Gedeh County, including Dougee.

73. The Panel compared the names of the January 2012 detainees with those who had arrived in Youbor, River Gee County, in May 2011, and who were not apprehended by the LNP. The Panel notes that its previous investigations into the activities of the convoy, including through interviews with the suspects, showed that nearly all of the individuals were combatants from Abidjan, with many having served as hard-line backers of the former Gbagbo regime. There is a very high likelihood that nine of the individuals arrested at the New York gold mining camp, such as Kenan Djouhombleca Hyacinthe Anderson cited above, were also members of the Youbor convoy, who had evaded arrest in River Gee County in June 2011. Moreover, it is likely that another four individuals arrested had also been part of the convoy. The Panel bases that observation on several sources of documentation citing the names, ages, and familial links of the individuals, as well as photographs obtained from Youbor, River Gbeh, and Zwedru. Furthermore, one of the women in the New York gold mine case, Davilla Tailey, informed the LNP that her husband had been jailed in Zwedru as part of the convoy. Her statement notes that two of her brothers travelled to New York gold camp, and that she followed them, spending the night in Prime Timber Production refugee camp with another woman whose husband was jailed in Zwedru as part of the Youbor convoy.

74. The Panel believes there is a high likelihood that the individuals arrested in New York gold mining camp had indeed been recruited to conduct an attack into Côte d'Ivoire. LNP officers noted that sources which had alerted the police in Bentley as to the group's movement into the goldfields had reported that and that some Ivorian detainees initially admitted to that allegation. A former Liberian mercenary commander with inside knowledge of recruitment in Grand Gedeh informed the Panel that several former mercenaries held a meeting in Grand Gedeh in early 2012 to plan for attacks across the border in Côte d'Ivoire, and that the mobilization of that group was linked to that meeting. The fact that some of the New York camp suspects had been hard-line combatants formerly based in Abidjan, and had entered Liberia with the Youbor convoy, suggests that that group had a certain military capacity, and was not merely a disorganized band of refugees looking for employment as short-term manual labourers. At the time of submission of the present report, the Panel obtained evidence and witness testimony that those individuals were operating under the direct command of a ranking militia leader, who had been active previously in Moyen-Cavally.

75. Moreover, Gladior is a known Liberian mercenary recruiter who had facilitated the movement of Liberian combatants to Côte d'Ivoire in 2010 and 2011. The leader of the Ivorians, Julien Gouhan, claimed in his statement to the LNP that he had travelled to New York camp to mine gold but that he did not know Tailey Gladior (annex 8); Gladior also claimed in his statement that the Ivorians had arrived at his camp without his knowledge, and that he requested that they leave the camp the following morning (annex 9). However, during the Panel's interviews with both Gouhan and Gladior in Zwedru and New York camp, respectively, in April 2012, both men confirmed that they were long-time friends, and knew each other from Côte d'Ivoire.

76. Lastly, the suspects who did relate in their statements to the LNP the mode of transport by which they moved to the New York gold camp, reported that they had travelled by motorcycle taxi to the gold camp with no mining equipment. Former detainees interviewed by the Panel in Zwedru in April 2012 further confirmed that they did not have mining equipment. The likelihood that a sizeable group of impoverished refugees paid relatively large amounts of money to take motorcycle taxis for a trip of more than two hours to a gold mining location where they had no guarantee of work, and where they had no access to mining tools (shovels, picks, etc.), does not appear credible. The outlay of capital to simply access the mining site, and the need to finance their own sustenance with no guarantee of work is not plausible, and the small size of New York camp means that the new workers probably would have more than trebled the existing workforce.

77. The inability of the Government of Liberia to implement a comprehensive strategy on former combatants who escaped the Ivorian crisis means that certain individuals and groups will likely continue to be involved in cross-border security issues. Following violence in the camp on 19 March 2012, 11 Ivorian individuals were arrested at the Dougee refugee camp. Four of those individuals had been involved previously in the New York gold mine case — of which three had also crossed into Liberia with the Youbor convoy in May 2011. The 19 March confrontation erupted over a mobile phone transaction between Ivorian refugees in the camp and a Liberian resident of neighbouring Dougee Town and resulted in a bitter altercation. The subsequent fight involved sticks and knives, and the discharge of a 12-gauge shotgun, which resulted in a number of serious injuries, including to the Liberian. UNMIL reported that the following morning on 20 March 2012, a large group of Liberian youths from neighbouring Dougee Town invaded Block K of Dougee camp to avenge and arrest the suspects involved. Order was restored only by the deployment of the ERU to the camp, and the arrest of the 11 Ivorian suspects in the camp.

E. Attack on Sakré, western Côte d'Ivoire

78. During the night of 24 April 2012, a group of approximately 20 men attacked the Ivorian village of Sakré, approximately 25 km south of Tai, Côte d'Ivoire. The Panel received information from several sources that the attack had been carried out by a mixed group of Liberians and Ivorians armed with AK-47s, handmade 12-gauge pistols, and machetes. There are strong indications that the group crossed the Liberian-Ivorian border south-west of the Tempo border post (Glio-Twarbo), Grand Gedeh County, and into Nigre in western Côte d'Ivoire, before proceeding to Sakré.

79. Several independent sources have mentioned to the Panel that the attack was led by former Liberian MODEL commander Nyenzee Barhway with the aim of creating instability and looting property. However, there are other indications that the attack was carefully planned as specific households were directly targeted — primarily civilians viewed by the attackers as Burkinabé or Malian. The Panel was also informed that meetings were regularly held beforehand in and around Ziah Refugee Camp and on the outskirts of Zwedru, Grand Gedeh County, involving both well-known Liberian mercenaries and Ivorians.

80. According to UNOCI, seven civilians were killed and another two injured during the 24 April incident, and several houses were destroyed. More than 3,000 civilians fled to nearby villages following the incident. During a confrontation with the Forces républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire and the Dozos (who are members of traditional hunting guilds like the Kamajors in Sierra Leone, and who now often act as local security forces), another woman was killed. The Forces républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire managed to capture four of the attackers, all of Ivorian nationality, who are now in the custody of the Government of Côte d'Ivoire. The Panel is following up with the Ivorian authorities in order to obtain further information and access to the detained suspects.

81. Historically, the Tai region of Côte d'Ivoire is the home of the Oubi ethnic group, which is closely associated with the Guerre ethnic group and which strongly supported the former Gbagbo regime. During the post-election crisis in Côte d'Ivoire late in 2010 and early in 2011, the majority of Oubi villagers fled to Liberia. Following that exodus, other ethnic groups, particularly those which originate from the north of the country, have occupied land in the Tai area. The Oubi are also closely linked to the Krahn population in Grand Gedeh County, Liberia, and many supported the armed MODEL group during the Liberian civil war.

82. According to information received from UNOCI, the Sakré attack illustrates a worrying trend, it being the fifth attack during the past 10 months — and the second this year in the Tai region of western Côte d'Ivoire — with an estimated 39 civilians killed. Other attacks in the Tai region include an incident on 2 July 2011 on the outskirts of Daobly village involving the killing of two civilians (Burkinabé) by a small, armed group. Again during the night of 18/19 July 2011, seven people were killed outside Ponan, located 10 km north of Tai. Between 15 and 16 September 2011, the villages of Zriglo and Nigre were attacked and 18 people were killed and several houses destroyed. Information received from UNOCI indicates that the armed group consisted of 15 to 17 men — both Ivorians and Liberians — armed with AK-47s and handmade 12-gauge shotguns. Again between 20 and 21 February 2012, the Ivorian village Ernestkro, located 7 km from the Liberian border, was attacked by a small group of armed men, killing an estimated five people. Two of the attackers were identified as being from the nearby village of Zriglo.

83. Even though there are strong indications that those attacks were economically motivated, the Panel also notes that following the attacks at Zriglo and Nigre in September 2011 and Ernestkro in February 2012, it was reported that the attacking groups had fled in the direction of Liberia and consisted of both Liberians and Ivorians.

F. Analysis of cases

84. The case studies above, as well as cases presented in the Panel's final 2011 report (S/2011/757), establish that the Government of Liberia has demonstrated limited capacity to effectively address the issue of Liberian mercenaries and Ivorian militia resident in Liberia. The inability of the Liberian authorities to successfully investigate and prosecute the cases outlined above suggests that there is no viable judicial mechanism for the Government, and especially security agencies under the Ministry of Justice, to successfully mitigate the problem presented by those groups of combatants residing in Liberia. More durable solutions would require sustained

and credible disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and reconciliation processes in the Liberian-Ivorian border region, with the full support of both the Liberian and Ivorian Governments. Such mechanisms do not appear to be available over the short term.

85. Civilians, as well as members of self-defence and militia groups fled the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire in 2011 and gained refugee status in Liberia. While recognizing that the majority of Ivorian refugees have returned to Côte d'Ivoire, the resistance of significant portions of the remaining refugees to return home, and especially militia members and politically active supporters of the former Gbagbo regime, should be seen in the light of perceived and real threats to their security in western Côte d'Ivoire, as well as land tenure disputes. Some refugees have informed the Panel that they hope for a sustainable solution in Côte d'Ivoire, including full access to their land. Other refugees informed the Panel that the war is not yet over. The Panel observed that there is no clear differentiation between the past and present status of individuals who formerly served as combatants in Côte d'Ivoire. Such a distinction concerning their readiness to again take up arms relies in part upon military or reconciliatory options available to them. Another important factor concerns subordination to hardline leaders, including within and around the refugee camps.

86. The Panel has been informed by its sources that Liberian mercenary generals and Ivorian militia leaders resident in Liberia, especially in Grand Gedeh County, attended several meetings in early 2012 to plan and organize cross-border raids into Côte d'Ivoire. The Panel received the dates and locations of these meetings, and also the names of those individuals present, and the Panel will continue to investigate that information. The actual capacity of those elements to undertake any cross-border raids is still uncertain and remains a priority for the Panel's further investigations. The desire by hardline elements to conduct such attacks, however, is commonly cited by the Panel's sources.

87. The Panel received further information from its sources concerning the provision of financing, and is investigating one courier in particular who served as a liaison between the former Gbagbo regime and Liberian mercenaries fighting in Moyen-Cavally, Côte d'Ivoire, in 2011. The Panel is concerned that such external financing is not confined to recipients in Grand Gedeh County alone. The Panel noted in its final 2011 report (S/2011/757, para. 87) that financing for the recruitment and operations of combatants resident in Liberia could serve as a key catalyst, which is a critical element distinguishing between the intentions of combatants and their capacity. The Panel is investigating whether possible support for cross-border military activities could have economic objectives, for example through the partial disruption of the harvesting and export of cocoa.

88. The Panel estimated in its final report of 2011 that several hundred military assault weapons remain buried in remote locations along the Liberian border with Côte d'Ivoire, and that those weapons caches remain accessible to Liberian mercenary commanders (S/2011/757, para. 86). The Panel further notes that pro-Gbagbo Liberian mercenaries and Ivorian militia likely hid larger stockpiles of weapons on the Ivorian side of the border, which, however, remain accessible to those individuals now resident in Liberia. When the groups retreated into Liberia in early 2011, they deposited numerous arms caches along the routes they used to escape from Côte d'Ivoire. The Panel is conducting investigations in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire to

identify those locations. Based upon the Panel's interviews of Liberian mercenaries in 2011 and 2012, as well as the Panel's observations of arms caches discovered along the Liberian-Ivorian border during that period, ammunition appears to be of limited availability. That could restrict the size and duration of any attempted cross-border attack, although 7.62-mm ammunition could be easily purchased through neighbouring States.

89. The shared border between Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire, especially remote forested areas, has proven inaccessible to the United Nations peacekeepers and security agencies of both the Governments of Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire. As such, investigations into the locations of arms caches rely primarily on combatant sources who had been involved in their concealment. The Panel noted previously that Ivorian militia leaders and Liberian mercenary generals maintained control over those caches (S/2011/757, para. 86) and as such the weapons will not be located ad hoc by Government of Liberia security agencies. Nor can it be expected that the weapons will be circulated widely, and possibly used in common criminal activity.

90. The Panel further remains concerned about the activity of Liberian mercenaries and Ivorian militia in Liberia's artisanal gold mining sector. As cited above, the Panel received information in April and May 2012 that some senior-ranking Liberian mercenaries with no association to the gold trade are actively seeking financing for cross-border raids into Côte d'Ivoire. However, the Panel has also received information that other mercenary and militia field commanders are involved in the artisanal gold sector, and use the mines as self-sufficient staging posts for their men while waiting or preparing for cross-border military activity. The presence of such groups in the gold mines is not uniform and presents numerous investigative challenges owing to the physical inaccessibility to the sites — some of which cannot be reached by road even during the dry season — as well as the difficulty of access to individuals within those closed and secretive communities. The Panel is particularly concerned about mines that are the least accessible to UNMIL and Government of Liberia security agencies, and in which there might be a greater coalescence of Liberian mercenaries and Ivorian militia.

VI. Travel ban and assets freeze

91. The Panel sought information from States concerning the implementation of the travel ban and assets freeze. In that regard, the Panel has to date transmitted nine letters to Member States requesting information on measures taken to implement the measures imposed by resolution 1521 (2003) concerning the travel ban and resolution 1532 (2004) concerning the assets freeze. That is in addition to 26 letters transmitted by the Panel in October 2011, for which there were 6 replies. The Panel also sought the assistance of the Government of Liberia regarding both the travel ban and assets freeze. The Panel received cooperation from the Liberian Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization. At the time of writing, the Liberian Ministry of Finance promised to assist the Panel's investigations as it had done in 2011, and the Panel plans to conduct follow-up meetings to access documentation during its third mission to Liberia.

A. Travel ban violations

92. The Governments of Austria and Croatia provided information to the Committee regarding travel of Slobodan Tesic in late 2010 and early 2011, including the identification of several passports used by Tesic, which do not feature on the travel ban List. The Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina provided the Committee with verification as to the issuance of a passport used by Tesic. The Committee further addressed official correspondence to the Government of the Republic of Serbia, for which the reply is outstanding. The Panel has detailed this information in annex 10.

B. Travel ban waivers

93. Tupee Enid Taylor, with Liberian passport number L014670, was granted a travel ban waiver from 10 to 17 February 2012, and again from 24 April until 2 May 2012, for medical reasons. The itinerary proposed for each trip was a round-trip flight from Monrovia to Lagos, Nigeria. Taylor's first travel in February 2012 was extended from 17 until 26 February for medical reasons.

94. Jewel Howard-Taylor, with Liberian diplomatic passport number D000433, expiring on 10 April 2012, was granted a travel ban waiver from 17 February to 15 March for a round-trip flight from Monrovia to Accra, Ghana. Howard-Taylor subsequently informed the Committee that she had amended her travel to depart from Monrovia on 20 February and returned on 15 March 2012. The Liberian Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization provided the Panel with a list of Howard-Taylor's entries and exits from Liberia, but it had no records for 2012.

95. Emmanuel L. Shaw II, with Liberian passport number L058183, was granted a travel ban waiver from 6 to 30 May 2012 for medical reasons. The itinerary proposed a round-trip flight from Monrovia to Brussels, Belgium. Shaw consequently submitted a request to postpone the dates of travel to 20 May until 17 June 2012.

96. Edwin Snowe, with Liberian diplomatic passport D000876, expiring 31 August 2013, requested a travel ban waiver on 3 April 2012 for medical reasons. UNMIL requested additional information from Snowe in order to process the request, but did not receive a reply.

97. Benoni Urey, with Liberian passport number L055520, expiring 11 March 2017, was granted a travel ban waiver from 7 April until 7 May 2012 for medical reasons. The itinerary proposed a round-trip flight from Monrovia to Johannesburg, South Africa, via Nairobi, Kenya. Urey's trip was shortened, and he returned to Monrovia on 28 April 2012.

C. Assets freeze

98. The Panel notes that the Government of Liberia has not taken any action to freeze the assets of listed individuals. The Panel continued to investigate cases presented in its previous report (S/2011/757), and obtained permission from the Liberian Ministry of Finance in mid-May 2012 to review documentation concerning

cases of interest to the Panel. The investigations will take place in the Panel's forthcoming missions to Liberia.

VII. Recommendations

A. Natural resources

99. The Government of Liberia should take immediate steps to strengthen capacity with the system of internal controls that underpin the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. Failure to do so will render key components of the scheme redundant, and therefore jeopardize the credibility of the entire scheme in Liberia.

100. The Government of Liberia should take urgent steps to exercise some degree of control over the alluvial gold sector. In that regard, the Panel urges the Government of Liberia to engage with OECD and seek assistance in the strengthening of due diligence and chains of custody within the gold supply chain.

B. Arms inspections

101. The Armed Forces of Liberia and Liberian security agencies should clarify which standards they intend to adopt for safety and storage of arms and ammunition, as well as marking and record keeping. Accordingly, all concerned personnel should be properly trained in the use of those standards.

102. The Government of Liberia should accelerate the process of enacting legislation on small arms control, as well as formally establish the National Commission of Small Arms, and implement the provisions contained therein.

C. Mercenaries/militia

103. The Panel welcomes recent initiatives concerning border security taken by the Governments of Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire unilaterally and through the Manu River Union. The Governments of Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire should increase their presence in the shared border region, and enact measures to enhance confidence-building among local communities on both sides of the border.

104. The Panel welcomes initiatives taken by UNMIL and UNOCI as well as the wider United Nations community to enhance information exchange through its Inter-Mission Coordination, and to find sustainable solutions to the situation in the Liberian-Ivorian border region. The Panel notes the March 2012 development of a joint road map focusing on security and stability in that border region. However, the Panel also notes that there has been limited implementation of the road map to date. The Panel recommends prioritization of its immediate application.

105. The Panel recommends that United Nations agencies implement a cross-border programme focusing on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, community violence reduction and social cohesion along with livelihood support especially to former combatants and youth at risk in key locations such as the Tai-Tempo axis, and the Toulepleu-Toe Town-Zwedru axis.

106. The Panel notes the limited information available concerning the current status and organization of Liberian mercenaries and Ivorian militia leaders residing in Liberia. Moreover, the Panel notes that there is minimal interaction between the United Nations and those groups. UNMIL and UNOCI should establish a joint working group on Ivorian militia and Liberian mercenaries residing in the Liberian-Ivorian border region. The working group should focus on data collection and analysis, and involve civilian, police and military staff.

107. UNMIL should consider deploying sufficient numbers of French-speaking staff to border counties who can monitor the situation and directly interact with former combatants and Ivorian militia as well as counterparts in Côte d'Ivoire.

108. UNMIL should conduct a thorough and ongoing review of judicial cases involving mercenaries and militia, with a view towards assisting the Liberian Ministry of Justice, including LNP, in its investigation.

Annexes

Annex 1
List of meetings

Liberia

Government of Liberia

Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization

Forestry Development Authority

Government Diamond Office

Liberia National Police

Liberian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative

Liberia Refugee Repatriation and Reintegration Commission

Ministry of Commerce

Ministry of Defence

Ministry of Finance

Ministry of Justice

Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy

National Security Agency

Precious Minerals Office

United Nations

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

United Nations Children's Fund

United Nations Mission in Liberia

Private

Putu Iron Ore Mining Company

Côte d'Ivoire

Government

Forces républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire

Préfet of Toulepleu

United Nations

United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire

Non-governmental organizations

Danish Refugee Council

International

International Committee of the Red Cross

Annex 2
Open cast gold mine Bentley camp



Annex 3
Deep cast gold mine (90 metres), Bartel Jam

Annex 4
Executive Order No. 34 — Extension of total ban on firearms and ammunition

REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA

THE PRESIDENT

EXECUTIVE ORDER Nº 34
EXTENSION OF TOTAL BAN ON FIREARMS AND AMMUNITIONS

WHEREAS, Executive Order #28 reinstituted a total ban on the ownership, possession, use, sale or manufacture of firearms, which included all arms of precision such as flintlock guns with unrifled barrels and shotguns, except for single barrel guns used solely for hunting; and

WHEREAS, Executive Order #28 has expired but there has been no corresponding change in the environment that necessitated the promulgation of that Executive Order; and

WHEREAS, the Government of Liberia continues to be concerned about the grave danger to the public safety and national security; and

WHEREAS, it has become necessary in the public interest to issue an Executive Order to address the proliferation of small arms and ammunition in the country which threaten the health, safety and welfare of the Nation; and

WHEREAS, Liberia, as a member state of ECOWAS, has subscribe to the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms which entered into force on September 29, 2009, and Government is therefore responsible to properly collect and destroy small arms, light weapons and ammunition;

NOW THEREFORE, with the intention of achieving a firearm free Liberia in protection of the public and implementation of the relevant Convention of ECOWAS and until such time that appropriate legal and security legislation can be enacted, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. That for the purposes of this Executive Order, the term "firearm" includes all arms of precision, flintlock guns with unrifled barrels, shotguns, and shotgun pistols that use single barrel ammunitions or rounds; except for single barrel guns which shall be used solely for hunting, provided those guns shall be registered with the Ministry of Justice through the office of the Superintendent in each County.

2. That for purposes of this Executive Order, the term "shotgun" means a weapon designed or redesigned or made or remade and intended to be fired from the shoulder, and designed or redesigned or made or remade to use the energy of the explosive in a fixed shotgun shell to fire through a smooth bore either a number of ball shots or a single projectile for each single pull of the trigger.

3. That no individual, group, organization or entity other than the Government of Liberia may own, possess, or cause to be brought into Liberia any firearm of any type, caliber or design or any ammunition or parts for any firearm, or any tooling equipment intended for the purposes of manufacture, assembly, or re-tooling of firearms of any type. This prohibition includes any firearm previously registered under the provisions of the Firearms Traffic Act of 1956.

4. That any person, group, organization or entity in possession of any firearm, ammunition or part for any firearm or tooling equipment shall deposit same with the headquarters of the Liberian National Police in the County in which the individual, group, organization or entity maintains such possession, within sixty (60) days of the issuance of this Executive Order. The County Headquarters of the Liberian National Police shall issue a receipt to the depositor in respect of that deposit.

5. If in the course of an investigation conducted by the Liberian National Police or any duly constituted law enforcement authority, including but not limited to a search incident to a lawful warrant, any weapon banned by this Executive Order is discovered, the authority may confiscate the banned firearm or ammunition.

GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND SEAL OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA, THIS 20th DAY OF OCTOBER, A.D. 2011

Ellen Johnson Sirleaf
PRESIDENT
REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA

Annex 5
Statement of Isaac Chegbo (aka Bob Marley)



Name of wife/husband:

Occupation (professional, educational): footballer Contact number (phone): 0886020452

Name and address of employer:

Special signs/physical marks, etc.:

If the suspect is a foreign national, the following question is to be asked!

Question:	Do you agree that when I arrested you I informed you that you had the right to contact diplomatic or consular officials of your country?
Answer:	

Rights

1.	I advise that you still have all of your rights that I explained to you upon your arrest and that you may exercise any or all of these rights now or at any time you wish.
2.	You have the right to remain silent and not to admit guilt, and your silence will not be interpreted as an admission.
3.	You have the right to contact a relative or close friend and be visited by such person.
4.	You have the right to contact a legal representative and communicate with him or her confidentially. If you are unable to pay for a lawyer, you have the right that a legal representative will be appointed at no cost to you.
5.	You have the right to be questioned in the presence of a legal representative, unless the right is waived.
Question:	Did you understand all your rights? YES
Answer:	YES
Question:	Do you want to exercise your rights at this time?
Answer:	YES

Start of the Interview

I/We wish to speak with you regarding...	Mercenarism
Question:	Do you understand?
Answer:	YES

I left Liberia in 2002 for Ivory Coast and was residing in Gekedo, a refugee Camp called Negle. Before leaving for Ivory Coast I fought in the Liberian civil Crisis on the side of the Ulimo-J led by the late Samuel K. Doe. My Commander was Apollo Teaswen. In 2011 I was called by a Liberian called Solo who lives from Maryland County that the Ivorian Government wanted us to help fight their war against the Rebels. We asked how are we to help.

1

Signature of respondent: (or fingerprint)

Signature of investigator (s):

Page .... of ...

Later, we had a meeting with Sergeant Major [illegible] Gbeyen and Lt. Hatting Barrecks at Gekle. We were told to be there that we in attendance.

Following that, we told Solo that we wanted to see the major Chief because Solo was always telling don't. Based upon that report a five man team was formed to include myself (Sidia Cheeon), Puah Tay also known as Ules, Tom Tarkot, Flatson Garblah and Bobby Sarpee.

Later, we went to Abidjan and met with Wlayee Delafor.

In our Meeting with Wlayee Delafor, he said they wanted us to help. The meeting was held sometime in February 2011.

Our concern to Wlayee Delafor, what will be our term of reference if we help them in the fight. Wlayee Delafor response a combination of the information Solo gave that whatever we capture will be ours. During our stay we resided at Hotel Plateau. All in our stay in Abidjan, we did not see President Gbagbo but a high power delegation led by Superintendent Delafor.

After the four days we stay in Abidjan, we returned to Gekle and briefed our men. Later, the Ivorian Government gave us 55 AK 47 assault rifles. We used these weapons while some of us were not armed but were with the armed men. We were considered Special Forces so, we were not given any formal training.

When we got to Gekle, our first mission was at Tuobly and we were successful by driving away the New Force rebel toward Bewein and Zonwein.

When New Forces Knowing our might, they re-organized hierarchy and started attacking us by taking all the areas we had and even Bolofon. As we began to lose ground, we Liberians decided to return to Liberia, we noticed that most of our men died or injured. We also noticed that some Malians, Burkinabes and Ivory Coasians were fighting alone side the Rebels that were supporting Ouattara. The rebels

Signature of respondent: _____ Signature of Investigator (s): _____ Page 2 of 3

(or fingerprint)



Page 3 of 3

Signature of respondent:

Signature of Investigator (s):

of Kenan Djouhombleca Hyacinthe Anderson

Annex 7
Documentation concerning arrival of Kenan Djouhombleca in Liberia

12-35834

Annex 8
Statement of Julien Gouhan





Annex 9
Statement of Tailey Gladior

Annex 10
Travel of Slobodan Tesic

At the request of the Committee, the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Croatia to the United Nations conveyed to the Committee on 9 February 2012 information pertaining to the travel of Slobodan Tesic in late 2010. According to this information, Tesic was denied entry at Dubrovnik airport, Croatia, on 11 November 2010 owing to the fact that he was listed on the Liberia Sanctions Committee Travel Ban List. Tesic arrived at Dubrovnik airport after the Austrian Airlines flight on which he was travelling from Vienna, Austria, to Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, was diverted to Dubrovnik because of poor weather conditions. He subsequently flew to Sarajevo on the same flight on 12 November 2010.

The Government of the Republic of Croatia noted that during his attempt to enter Croatia, Tesic used a passport of the Republic of Serbia number 009511357, issued in Belgrade, Serbia, on 27 October 2010, and due to expire on 27 October 2020. This is a different passport from the one cited on the Travel Ban List. The Government of Croatia noted that the Croatian police detected three more passports used by Tesic, as follows:

- Serbia, number 006312941, valid from 13 May 2008 to 13 May 2018 (as cited on Travel Ban List)
- Serbia, number 007671811, valid from 5 August 2009 to 5 August 2019
- Bosnia and Herzegovina, number 5848759, valid from 13 March 2008 to 13 March 2013.

The Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in a note verbale to the Committee dated 7 May 2012, confirmed that the Ministry of Interior of Central Bosnia Canton in Travnik issued the passport listed above with number 5848759.

The Government of Austria provided additional information to the Committee on 30 March 2012 regarding the travel of Tesic to and from Austria. The Austrian authorities could provide no further information regarding the departure of Tesic from Austria on the Austrian Airlines flight that was later diverted to Dubrovnik in November 2010. The Government of Austria held the view that at that time Tesic was not subject to a specific travel ban notice, possibly because the Travel Ban List of the Committee of 28 November 2007 did not provide a date of birth for Tesic, an identifier that the Austrian Government notes is required for the issuance of such notices.

The Government of Austria notes that Tesic was denied entry into Austria, however, on a flight from Belgrade on 10 May 2011. The official communication from the Government of Austria further notes that Tesic argued against his denial of entry, stating that he had thus far been travelling throughout Europe without any problems. Following the denial of entry, Tesic flew back to Belgrade on the evening of 10 May 2011, and the Government of Austria is not aware of any further attempts by Tesic to enter the country since that date.

The passport that Tesic used in the attempt to gain access to Austria on 10 May 2011, number 009511357 and issued by the Republic of Serbia, contained entry and exit stamps from the following airports:

Munich 5 November 2010 (entry by plane); Brnik 7 November 2010 (exit by plane); Vienna 11 November 2010 (entry by plane); Vienna 8 February 2011 (entry by plane); Munich 18 February 2011 (entry by plane); Munich 20 February 2011 (exit by plane); Vienna 7 March 2011 (entry by plane); Munich 30 March 2011 (entry by plane); Munich 31 March 2011 (exit by plane); Istanbul 20 April 2011 (illegible); Istanbul 27 April 2011 (illegible); Zurich 29 April 2011 (entry by plane); and Zurich 3 May 2011 (exit by plane).

United Nations S/2012/449

Security Council

Distr.: General
18 June 2012

Original: English

Letter dated 18 June 2012 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2048 (2012) concerning Guinea-Bissau addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2048 (2012) concerning Guinea-Bissau, I have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Committee dated 18 June 2012, submitted in accordance with paragraph 9 (d) of the same resolution (see annex).

(*Signed*) Mohammed **Loulichki**
Chair
Security Council Committee established
pursuant to resolution 2048 (2012) concerning Guinea-Bissau

12-37916 (E) 190612

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 18 June 2012 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2048 (2012) concerning Guinea-Bissau addressed to the President of the Security Council

Report submitted in accordance to paragraph 9 (d) of Security Council resolution 2048 (2012)

1. In accordance with paragraph 9 (d) of Security Council resolution 2048 (2012) of 18 May 2012, I have the honour to report to the Security Council on the work of the Committee established by the same resolution.

2. The mandate of this Committee includes monitoring the implementation of the measures imposed by paragraph 4 of resolution 2048 (2012) (travel ban); designating those individuals subject to the travel ban and considering requests for exemptions; encouraging a dialogue between the Committee and interested Member States and international, regional and subregional organizations; and examining and taking appropriate action on information regarding alleged violations or non-compliance with the measures imposed by resolution 2048 (2012).

3. There are currently five individuals designated as subject to the travel ban.

4. The Chair, with the assistance of the Secretariat, is currently preparing the provisional guidelines for the conduct of its work, in accordance with paragraph 9 (c) of resolution 2048 (2012), as well as a draft note verbale to all Member States reminding them to report to the Committee on the implementation of paragraph 4 of resolution 2048 (2012), regarding the travel ban, within 120 days of the adoption of resolution 2048 (2012). Once approved by the Committee, these documents will be made available on the Committee website.

5. The Chair intends to hold the first informal consultations of the Committee in the upcoming weeks, as required.

United Nations A/ES-10/558–S/2012/450

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
19 June 2012

Original: English

General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Security Council
Sixty-seventh year

Identical letters dated 18 June 2012 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

It is with regret that I must draw your attention to the fact that this past week the Palestinian people solemnly marked the fifth year since the imposition of Israel's illegal blockade against the Gaza Strip. This immoral, inhumane blockade has been imposed by the occupying Power since June 2007, in collective punishment of the over 1.6 million Palestinian civilians living there, in deliberate, grave breach of international law, specifically the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits the occupying Power from collectively punishing protected persons and prohibits pillaging and reprisals against them and their property (article 33), and article 50 of the Hague Regulations, recognized by the international community as customary international law, as well as in violation of the population's basic human rights.

The repeated international calls on Israel, the occupying Power, to end this suffocating, destructive land, air and sea blockade have gone unheeded, and Israel continues to obstruct the free movement of persons and goods, including essential humanitarian goods, reconstruction materials and commercial flows. As a result, the humanitarian and socioeconomic situation in Gaza Strip remains critical and the fabric of Palestinian life there continues to be gravely impaired. After half a decade of this collective punishment, poverty and unemployment are rampant; malnutrition is prevalent in the majority of children; vital civilian infrastructure, including hospitals, electric power plants, roads, and water and sanitation systems, is deteriorating into disrepair or remains damaged or destroyed as a result of the December 2008-January 2009 Israeli military aggression; reconstruction has barely progressed; and the economy and normal commerce are in tatters, with ongoing restrictions preventing sustainable economic growth.

Gaza also continues to be the target of Israeli military strikes on civilian areas and fishing boats that have caused death and injury to civilians and more destruction

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of properties. In this regard, Israeli airstrikes launched today killed two Palestinian men near Beit Hanoun and were preceded by missile strikes on an area in Rafah, on Sunday, 17 June, that caused injury to at least five other people, including a woman and child. Palestinian farmers in Gaza and fishermen also continue to be targeted by Israeli gunfire and artillery, a constant threat to their safety and their livelihoods.

The situation in Gaza thus remains precarious, with any normalcy of life precluded by the occupying Power's repressive and violent measures. As documented by various United Nations agencies, including, inter alia, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the occupied Palestinian territory, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and the World Health Organization (WHO) and other international organizations, at least 44 per cent of Palestinians in Gaza are food insecure and 80 per cent are aid dependent. Unemployment remains high, affecting at least 34 per cent of the population, including over half of youth. It is also estimated that 38 per cent of the population lives below the poverty line as livelihoods continue to be undermined. Severe restrictions on exports continue, and access to 35 per cent of farmland and 85 per cent of fishing waters is completely or partially restricted, resulting, inter alia, in the loss of an estimated 75,000 metric tons of produce yearly and loss of income for approximately 35,000 people dependent on the fishing industry. Access to education and medical treatment outside of Gaza and family visits to Palestinians from Gaza imprisoned by Israel also continue to be obstructed. Moreover, the well-being of the population and environmental conditions continue to be seriously impacted by power outages up to 12 hours a day owing to fuel and electricity shortages, the daily dumping of 90 million litres of untreated sewage into the sea, and the fact that over 90 per cent of the water from the Gaza aquifer is unsafe for human consumption without treatment.

We are grateful for the international community's consistent demand that Israel, the occupying Power, bring an end to this unjust situation and for redress of this man-made humanitarian disaster. The calls on Israel to lift the blockade and allow for the sustained, regular movement of people and goods to and from Gaza and the restoration of its link with the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory and the calls and substantial support for the reconstruction of Gaza must not relent. In this regard, we draw attention to, and express deep gratitude for, the joint appeal recently issued, on 14 June 2012, by 50 international aid groups and United Nations agencies calling on Israel to lift the blockade. In that appeal, the signatories stated, inter alia: "For over five years in Gaza, more than 1.6 million people have been under blockade in violation of international law. More than half of these people are children. We the undersigned say with one voice: 'end the blockade now'."

We call on Israel, the occupying Power, to heed the will of the international community and to act forthwith in accordance with its obligations under international law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention, and relevant United Nations resolutions, including Security Council resolution 1860 (2009), to end this blockade of the Gaza Strip and to cease its violation of the human rights of our people there. Israel cannot be absolved of its legal obligations at the expense of the lives, well-being and livelihood of the more than 1.6 million Palestinians, who are being brutally subjected to such harsh and prolonged collective punishment. The international community, including the United Nations, must respect its legal obligations in this regard and act collectively, bearing in mind the above moral appeal by agencies and international organizations representing a wide segment of

humanitarian and human rights groups from around the world, to help to bring a definitive end to this unjust situation afflicting the Palestinian people in Gaza.

This letter is in follow-up to our previous 429 letters regarding the ongoing crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, since 28 September 2000. These letters, dated from 29 September 2000 (A/55/432-S/2000/921) to 7 June 2012 (A/ES-10/557-S/2012/410) constitute a basic record of the crimes being committed by Israel, the occupying Power, against the Palestinian people since September 2000. For all of these war crimes, acts of State terrorism and systematic human rights violations committed against the Palestinian people, Israel, the occupying Power, must be held accountable and the perpetrators must be brought to justice.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the present letter distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Feda Abdelhady **Nasser**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the alternate representatives of Colombia on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received credentials from the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Colombia, signed on 11 May 2012, stating that Mr. Miguel Camilo Ruiz Blanco, Mrs. Maria Paulina Davila and Mr. Camilo Louis have been appointed alternate representatives of Colombia on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, these credentials are in order.

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